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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of small, battery-powered 
devices called sensor nodes. Sensor nodes have sensing, processing and communication 
capabilities to monitor the environment and gather data. WSNs have various application 
areas ranging from military surveillance to forest fire detection. Security is an important 
issue for Wireless Sensor Networks because sensor nodes are deployed in hostile and 
unattended areas. Nodes are vulnerable to physical capture attacks and the attackers can 
easily eavesdrop on network communications.  
To provide security to WSNs, many key predistribution schemes have been 
proposed. However, most of these schemes consider the static WSNs and they perform 
poorly when they are applied to Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs). In this 
thesis, we propose Dynamic Keyring Update (DKRU) mechanism for MWSNs. The 
aim of DKRU mechanism is to enable sensor nodes to update their keyrings periodically 
during movement, by observing the frequent keys in their neighbors. Our mechanism 
can be used together with different key predistribution schemes and it helps to increase 
the performance of them.  
For performance evaluation reasons, we used our mechanism together with an 
existing random key predistribution scheme and a location-based key predistribution 
scheme. For each of these key predistribution schemes, we analyzed our mechanism 
using two different mobility models. Our results show that DKRU mechanism increases 
the local and global connectivity when it is applied to MWSNs. Moreover, our 
mechanism is scalable and it does not cause significant degradation in network 
resiliency and communication overhead.    
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Özet 
Telsiz Duyarga Ağları (TDA), duyarga düğümleri olarak adlandırılan küçük ve pil 
gücü ile çalışan cihazlardan oluşur. Duyarga düğümleri, algılama, veri işleme ve 
iletişim yeteneklerini kullanarak çevreyi gözlemler ve veri toplarlar. TDA'ların, askeri 
taramadan orman yangını tespitine kadar çok çeşitli uygulama alanları bulunmaktadır. 
Bu uygulamalarda duyarga düğümleri genel olarak gözetimsiz ve kontrolden uzak 
alanlara bırakılırlar. Bu sebeple, düğümler fiziksel anlamda ele geçirilmeye müsaittirler. 
Ayrıca ağdaki bağlantılar bir saldırgan tarafından kolaylıkla dinlenebilir. Bu yüzden, 
TDA'larda ağ güvenliğini sağlamak önemli bir sorun haline gelmiştir.   
TDA'larda güvenlik sorununu çözmek için bir çok ön yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım 
şeması önerilmiştir. Fakat, bu şemaların çoğu duyarga düğümlerinin durağan olduğunu 
varsayar ve Mobil Telsiz Duyarga Ağlarına (MTDA) uygulandıklarında yetersiz 
kalırlar. Bu tezde, MTDA'lar için Dinamik Anahtar Halkası Güncelleme (DAHG) 
mekanizması sunulmaktadır. Bu mekanizmanın amacı, duyarga düğümlerinin 
hareketleri sırasında komşularında sıklıkla bulunan anahtarları gözlemleyerek, kendi 
anahtar halkalarını periyodik olarak güncellemeleridir. Mekanizmamız farklı ön 
yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım şemaları ile birlikte kullanılabilir ve bu şemaların 
performansının arttırılmasına yardımcı olur.  
Performans değerlendirmelerinde mekanizmamız, bir rastgele ön yüklemeli 
anahtar dağıtım şeması, bir de konuma dayalı ön yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım şeması 
olmak üzere iki farklı şemayı temel alacak şekilde kullanılmıştır. Her iki ön yüklemeli 
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anahtar dağıtım şeması için ayrıca iki farklı mobilite modeli ile analizler yapılmıştır. 
Değerlendirme sonuçlarımız, DAHG mekanizmasının her durumda ağdaki yerel ve 
genel bağlantı oranlarını arttırdığını göstermiştir. Ayrıca mekanizmamız 
ölçeklendirilebilir olup, ağ dayanıklılığına zarar vermez ve düşük bir ek iletişim 
maliyeti gerektirir.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), consisting of small, autonomous devices 
called sensor nodes, have increasing range of application areas such as military 
surveillance, environmental tracking or hazard detection, patient monitoring and smart 
home applications [1]. All these applications convey sensitive data, so they require a 
secure communication medium among the sensor nodes and the base station (sink 
node), where the data is collected. However, sensor nodes have many limitations that 
make it complicated to develop security protocols for WSNs. Sensor nodes are battery-
powered, memory-constrained and they have limited computation and transmission 
power. Moreover, they are vulnerable to physical capture attacks because making the 
sensor nodes tamper-proof is too costly [2]. Due to these limitations of sensor nodes,  
using asymmetric cryptography is not a feasible solution to provide security for WSNs. 
Using symmetric cryptography with a single network-wide key or using pairwise shared 
keys are also not applicable solutions considering the physical attack threats, memory 
limitations and scalability issues [2].   
A promising solution on key distribution, which is suitable for most of the 
requirements and limitations of WSNs, is proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [3] in 
2002. In their scheme, a set of  keys are randomly distributed to sensor nodes from a 
key pool before deployment, so that two nodes can communicate with each other if they 
share any common keys. This scheme is also referred as the basic scheme. There are 
many studies in the literature which are based on the notion of the predistribution of 
keying material. These studies include the matrix based, polynomial based, 
combinatorial design based and location based approaches [4]. All these studies assume 
the sensor nodes to be static, which means that their location does not change after 
initial deployment.  
The concept of Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs) emerged later than 
the static WSNs. In MWSNs, sensor nodes and/or other entities in sensor network are 
mobile, which means that the topology of network dynamically changes. MWSNs has 
 2  
 
many advantages over static WSNs, however most of the efficient security protocols 
proposed for static WSNs perform poorly in MWSNs [5]. 
1.1.  Our Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis 
Most of the solutions on the key distribution problem in WSNs assume that the 
sensor nodes are static. However, many application areas of WSNs require the sensor 
nodes to be mobile, such as battlefield surveillance, vehicle tracking, animal tracking, 
etc. Our initial analyses show that existing schemes perform poorly in Mobile Wireless 
Sensor Networks (MWSNs). The random keyring based solutions require high keyring 
size to achieve an acceptable level of connectivity, which results in an increase in 
memory overhead and decrease in resiliency. The location based solutions can provide 
better connectivity for a short time after deployment, however because the sensor nodes 
are mobile, the initial deployment knowledge becomes useless and network connectivity 
decreases substantially over time. Although there exist some work in the literature 
focusing on key distribution in MWSNs, most of these studies support limited node 
mobility or they introduce expensive protocols for key establishment. Overall, there is 
room for improvement in connectivity and resiliency of MWSNs, as the mobility 
feature of WSNs is understood better. 
Our aim in this thesis is to turn the node mobility into advantage by providing a 
smart keyring update mechanism for sensor nodes. Using this mechanism, sensor nodes 
can re-organize their keyrings with the help of the base stations in the area. This 
mechanism can be used together with different key predistribution schemes. Regardless 
of the initial key predistribution scheme, our mechanism increases the local and global 
connectivity values, without an important decrease in resiliency. Moreover, it does not 
require an increase in the keyring size and it causes only a small amount of 
communication overhead. We evaluated the performance of our dynamic keyring 
update (DKRU) mechanism, by applying it to two different random key predistribution 
schemes, which are the basic scheme [3] and a deployment knowledge based scheme 
proposed in [6]. Then, we measure the global connectivity, local connectivity, resiliency 
and communication overhead of the network via simulations. According to our 
simulation results, DKRU mechanism provides almost perfect global connectivity and 
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increases the local connectivity by almost 40%, without a significant change in 
resiliency and communication overhead. Moreover, we show that our mechanism is 
scalable over different network sizes. 
1.2.  Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, background 
information is given about Wireless Sensor Networks, their constraints, security 
requirements and mobility features. This section also includes the related work about 
key distribution schemes in WSNs and MWSNs. The proposed mechanism is explained 
in Section 3. Section 4 describes the performance metrics and incorporation of proposed 
mechanism with existing schemes. Performance evaluation of the proposed mechanism 
is presented comparatively in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes 
the thesis. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we give more detailed information about Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs), their security requirements and limitations. We also explain the 
necessary cryptography background and summarize the related work on WSN security. 
Finally, we focus on the need for mobility in WSNs and introduce the proposed 
mobility models. 
2.1.  Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of small sensor nodes, which are 
low-powered, low-cost and multifunctional devices using micro-electro-mechanical 
systems (MEMS) technology and wireless communication [1]. The duty of sensor nodes 
is to gather data by sensing the environment, process this data and transmit it to a 
nearby base station. Base stations collect data from sensor nodes and send this data to a 
remote system via their direct connection to external network. Base stations also 
perform costly operations and manage the network. Hence, base stations have more 
resources compared to sensor nodes.  
WSNs can be categorized as hierarchical and distributed sensor networks. In 
hierarchical WSNs, sensor nodes are divided into clusters and nodes in a cluster 
communicate with the cluster head.  Cluster heads relay data between cluster members, 
other cluster heads and base station. In this hierarchical architecture, failure of a cluster 
head causes lack of communication with the nodes in that cluster. On the other hand, in 
distributed WSNs there is no fixed infrastructure. Sensor nodes are deployed to an area 
and after deployment they form a self organizing, multi-hop wireless network. Hence, 
failure of a node does not affect a large proportion of network. In this thesis, we work 
on distributed WSNs.  
Sensor nodes are able to monitor a wide range of environmental conditions such 
as temperature, humidity, lightning, noise, vehicular movement, speed of an object etc. 
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[1]. Some of the important application areas of WSNs are military applications (e.g. 
battlefield surveillance, vehicle tracking), environmental applications (e.g. frost fire 
detection, animal tracking), health applications (e.g. monitoring patient data) and home 
applications (e.g. smart homes) [1]. According to the requirements of applications, 
sensor nodes can be static or mobile. Most of the studies in literature propose solutions 
for static sensor networks. Mobile sensor networks (MWSNs), on the other hand, 
introduce different challenges such as dynamic network topology, high power 
consumption and localization problems. There are studies in the literature that focus on 
these challenges, investigate the impact of mobility on sensor network performance and 
propose network architectures and realistic mobility models for MWSNs. In this thesis, 
we address the tradeoff between security and connectivity in MWSNs. Our aim is to 
increase the secure network connectivity of MWSNs, without deteriorating the 
resiliency of network against node capture attacks.  
2.1.1.  Security Requirements of WSNs 
Application areas of sensor networks bring out different security requirements to 
the data carried by sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are usually deployed in hostile and 
unattended areas. Hence, it may be impossible to provide continuous surveillance after 
deployment. Moreover, wireless communication can be easily monitored by attackers. 
While the security requirements may change with respect to the application type, the 
most significant security needs of WSNs can be listed as follows [7, 8, 9]. 
 Confidentiality, assures that the data transmitted between sensor nodes cannot 
be accessed by unauthorized parties.  
 Integrity, guarantees that a message is not modified by an attacker or 
malignant node during its transmission from one node to another.  
 Authenticity, ensures that a malicious node cannot masquerade as a trusted 
network node. 
 Availability, ensures that the desired network services are available whenever 
they are needed. 
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2.1.2.  Constraints of WSNs 
Security services for WSNs could be maintained via cryptographic protocols, just like 
other types of networks. However, sensor nodes have various limitations, which makes 
it impractical to use the traditional methods to provide security. Main constraints of 
WSNs can be listed as follows [7, 8, 9]. 
 Power constraints: Power requirements of sensor nodes include the 
computation, communication and sensing capabilities. Because sensor nodes are 
battery-powered and they cannot be re-charged frequently, it is important to 
minimize the energy consumption of nodes to increase their life-span. 
Unfortunately, many of the cryptographic algorithms are complex and require 
high amount of computation, so they are unsuitable for WSNs. 
 Memory and storage limitations: Sensor nodes have small amount of memory 
and storage space. This space is used for application program, computation 
results and sensor data. Due to the limited space, usually there is not enough 
memory to run complicated cryptograhic algorithms. 
 Unreliable communication: Sensor networks are inherently unreliable due to 
their connectionless, broadcast nature. During transmission, packets may get 
corrupted or get lost due to high congestion.  
 Unattended operation: Sensor nodes may be left unattended for long time 
periods. During this period, nodes can be exposed to physical capture attacks or 
other environmental hazards. Moreover, managing the network remotely makes 
it impossible to detect physical tampering and making the sensor nodes tamper-
proof is not so feasible due to its high cost. 
2.2.  Overview of Cryptographic Primitives used in this Thesis 
Cryptographic algorithms are used to achieve various aspects of information 
security in computer systems. One of them is for confidentiality, which is needed for the 
mechanism proposed in this thesis. Cryptographic algorithms that provide 
confidentiality can be categorized as (i) asymmetric key cryptography and (ii) 
symmetric key cryptography. Although some research has been done to facilitate the 
 7  
 
use of asymmetric cryptography [10, 11, 12, 13], symmetric key cryptosystems are far 
more efficient and preferable than asymmetric cryptosystems in WSNs. 
Symmetric key cryptography involves encryption methods, where the sender and 
receiver use the same key for encryption and decryption operations. As shown in Figure 
2.1,  a single key is generated by a key distribution mechanism and it is distributed to 
sender and receiver sides. This key represents a shared secret between sender and 
receiver parties that is used to maintain a secure communication channel between them.  
The encryption and decryption algorithms are publicly known, however one needs to 
know the secret key to be able to decrypt the ciphertext. For secure implementation of 
symmetric key cryptography, the symmetric encryption algorithm should be strong and 
the shared key should be known only by the sender and receiver.  
 
Figure 2.1 Symmetric key cryptography 
 
Some of the best known symmetric key algorithms can be listed as AES, RC4, 
DES [14] etc. On top of these, lightweight algorithms with small block size and key size 
can be preferred. Many studies in literature [15, 16, 17] focus on these lightweight, 
energy-efficient algorithms and their implementations in WSNs.  
 The main problem of symmetric key cryptography is distribution of the keying 
material to sender and receiver sides over an unreliable network. Many studies have 
been conducted to provide robust and reliable key distribution mechanisms for WSNs. 
These studies will be addressed in detail in the next subsection.  
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2.3.  Literature Survey of Key Distribution in WSNs 
Key distribution problem is studied broadly in WSNs. There are good surveys that 
categorize the existing key management schemes and analyze their performance such as 
[4, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. We also explain the main approaches to key distribution 
problem below.   
2.3.1.  Using single network-wide key 
In this approach, a single key is loaded to all sensor nodes in the network. The 
advantage of this approach is that all node pairs can communicate with each other using 
this single key. Hence, it provides perfect connectivity, which means that each pair of 
neighboring nodes can form a direct secure link. Moreover, each node keeps only one 
key, so memory requirement is minimal. BROSK [23] is an example of this approach, 
which distributes a single master key to all sensor nodes. When two nodes want to 
communicate, they create a session key using the master key and some other randomly 
generated information. The problem with network-wide key approach is its vulnerability 
to physical node capture attacks. When a node is captured by an attacker, master key 
can be found easily and this key can be used to compromise all the communication links 
in network. Hence, this approach can only be used if sensor nodes are tamper-proof, 
which is very costly for WSNs. 
2.3.2.  Using pairwise keys 
In this approach, if there are n nodes in network, each node is loaded with n-1 
keys, to communicate with every other node. In this way, each node pair shares a 
unique pairwise key. This approach provides perfect connectivity and also perfect 
resilience against node capture attacks because attackers cannot compromise the links 
between non-captured nodes. However, this solution brings a huge memory overhead to 
sensor nodes. Considering that the WSNs are usually composed of large number of 
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sensor nodes, using pairwise keys is an infeasible solution due to the memory and 
storage limitations of sensor nodes.  
2.3.3.  Probabilistic schemes 
Probabilistic schemes aim to balance the tradeoff between network connectivity, 
resiliency and memory overhead. They provide better resiliency than using single 
network-wide key, and their memory overhead is much less compared to pairwise 
schemes. However, they cannot provide perfect connectivity because they cannot 
guarantee that two nodes in the network will be able to communicate after deployment.   
The key predistribution scheme proposed in [3], also known as the basic scheme, 
is one of the first probabilistic key management schemes. Basic scheme is composed of 
three simple phases:  
1. Key predistribution phase: In this phase, firstly a large global key pool is 
generated. Then, each node is loaded with a subset of keys, chosen 
randomly from the global key pool without replacement. These keys are 
loaded to the memory of each sensor node, together with the key 
identifiers (IDs). These keys form the keyring of the node.  
2. Shared key discovery phase: After the nodes are deployed to the 
environment, shared key discovery phase begins. In this phase, sensor 
nodes broadcast their key identifiers in clear text. If two nodes are in 
communication range of each other and if they share at least one common 
key in their keyrings, then these two nodes can communicate securely 
using this common key, with symmetric encryption. In this case, there is a 
direct secure link between these nodes. However, shared key discovery 
phase does not ensure direct secure communication for all node pairs in 
wireless communication range.  
3. Path key establishment phase: If a pair of neighboring nodes does not 
share a common key, they cannot form a direct secure link after the shared 
key discovery phase. Path key establishment phase aims to assign keys to 
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these node pairs by using the help of secure links formed in previous 
phase. If   nodes A and B need to establish a secure communication, they 
find an intermediary node C, that has direct secure links with both A and 
B. Then, node C helps A and B to establish a key securely. However, this 
process causes extra communication cost, so it is important to have as 
much direct secure links as possible at the end of the shared key discovery 
phase. 
Basic scheme also has a tradeoff between connectivity and security. As the 
keyring size increases, the probability of forming a secure link between two nodes also 
increases. However, the network becomes less resilient to node capture attacks because 
more keys are compromised each time a node is captured. 
 To strengthen the security of basic scheme, many different approaches are 
proposed in literature. In  -composite random key predistribution scheme [24], two 
nodes are required to share at least   common keys to form a secure link. Moreover, the 
communication key is generated as the hash of all shared keys between these two nodes. 
 -composite scheme increases network resiliency at the cost of some computation 
overhead. However, to achieve the same level of connectivity with basic scheme, it 
requires an increase in the keyring size of nodes. When the keyring size is increased, 
more keys are compromised after a node capture. Thus,  -composite scheme can be 
disadvantageous in large-scale attacks.  Another modification to basic scheme, called 
Hashed Random Key Predistribution, is proposed in [25]. In this study, the keys in each 
node are hashed different number of times. Nodes keep their hashed keys together with 
the hashing amount. In the shared key discovery phase, two nodes equalize their 
hashing amounts and obtain a common key to use in symmetric encryption. This 
scheme improves the resilience of network, however causes some communication, 
memory and computation overhead. The session key scheme proposed in [26] aims to 
provide session keys to neighboring node pairs after shared key discovery phase. This 
scheme improves security, however a session key can also be compromised if the initial 
keys used to generate the session key  are compromised. Finally, the Key Redistribution 
scheme proposed in [27] replaces the original path key establishment phase of basic 
scheme with the key redistribution phase. In key redistribution phase, nodes analyze the 
key IDs received from their neighbors. If node A wants to communicate with node B, it 
finds an intermediary node C and asks node C to send a chosen key to node B. In this 
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way, node B obtains a key to communicate with node A. Moreover, after a few 
iterations of key redistribution phase, node A has common keys with all its neighbors, 
so it deletes the unused keys in its keyring. This scheme increases the connectivity and 
resiliency of network, however it causes high communication overhead due to the 
operations performed at each iteration of key redistribution phase.  
2.3.4.  Deployment knowledge based schemes 
To achieve better connectivity and resiliency than the random key predistribution 
schemes, some of the studies use other information such as the deployment location of 
sensor nodes. The scheme proposed by Du et al. [6] (will be referred as Du's scheme) 
utilizes the fact that sensor nodes will be deployed as groups. This deployment 
knowledge can be used to give common keys only to the neighboring groups, thus 
increasing connectivity. In this scheme, sensor nodes are divided into groups, and a key 
pool is constructed for each group. The key pools of horizontally, vertically or 
diagonally neighboring groups have certain amounts of overlapping keys. Figure 2.2 
demonstrates the zone based key pools and the amount of shared keys between these 
key pools. If the size of the global key pool is    , two horizontally or vertically 
neighboring key pools share      keys where   is the overlapping factor and 0 ≤   ≤ 
0.25. Two diagonally neighboring groups share      keys where   is another 
overlapping factor, 0 ≤   ≤ 0.25 and         . However, two non-neighboring key 
pools do not share any keys. 
In Du's scheme, groups of nodes are deployed to the area using grid pattern. The 
center point of each grid cell becomes the deployment point for nodes as it can be seen 
in Figure 2.3.a. Deployment follows a two dimensional Gaussian distribution within 
each grid cell. Figure 2.3.b demonstrates that, in this deployment model, node density is 
higher in the middle area of deployment region, compared to the areas that are close to 
the border.   
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Figure 2.2 Shared keys between neighboring key pools in Du’s Scheme [6] 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Deployment model of Du’s scheme [6] 
 
After the key predistribution and deployment phases, Du's scheme follows the 
shared key discovery and path key establishment steps of basic scheme. To achieve the 
same connectivity level with basic scheme, Du's scheme requires less number of keys in 
keyrings of nodes. Hence, Du's scheme decreases the memory overhead and increases 
the resilience of network.  
The Group Based Key Establishment scheme proposed in [28] assigns pairwise 
keys to the nodes in each group. Moreover, each sensor node is loaded with pairwise 
keys to communicate with nodes from other groups. If two nodes are in different groups 
and they do not have a pairwise key, they use intermediary nodes to establish a pairwise 
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key. This scheme is applicable only if the size of the groups is small. Other location 
based schemes can be found in [29, 30, 31]. The problem with location based schemes 
is that when they are applied to MWSNs, usage of deployment knowledge becomes a 
disadvantage in time. In [32], it is showed that the location based schemes do not have 
any superiority over random key predistribution schemes regarding the MWSNs. 
Moreover, for certain mobility models, location based schemes may perform far worse 
than the probabilistic schemes. Detailed analysis will be given in Section 4. 
2.3.5.  Matrix-based schemes 
These schemes are based on Blom's matrix based pairwise key distribution 
scheme proposed in [33]. In this scheme, a symmetric matrix of size n x n stores all the 
pairwise keys for a group of n nodes. Each element kij  in the matrix is used to secure the 
link between node i and node j. This matrix of keys is calculated using a private matrix 
and a public matrix of size ( 1 ) x n. Each node stores a row from the private matrix 
and a column from the public matrix. When two nodes want to communicate, they 
exchange their columns and the key is computed as the product of their private row and 
the column of other's. This scheme provides perfect connectivity. Moreover, it has λ-
secure property, which means that, if less than λ nodes are captured, none of the links 
are compromised. However, if  λ nodes are captured, the whole network becomes 
compromised. 
2.3.6.  Polynomial-based schemes 
The Polynomial based Key Predistribution scheme proposed in [34] uses 
randomly generated λ-degree polynomials. In key predistribution phase, each sensor is 
loaded with a partially evaluated polynomial share corresponding to its index. When 
node i and node j want to communicate, they evaluate the polynomial at point (i, j) and 
generate a key. This scheme also has perfect connectivity and λ-secure property. 
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2.3.7.  Combinatorial designs 
These schemes use deterministic approaches based on combinatorial design for 
key distribution. In some of these schemes, connectivity of network depends on the 
density of nodes, whereas some other studies provide full connectivity even in sparse 
networks. The schemes proposed by Çamtepe and Yener [35], uses several block design 
techniques to generate key chains and key pools. Their work provides better 
connectivity than probabilistic schemes, with smaller key size.  
2.3.8.  Schemes focusing on mobility 
Although there is limited work in literature for the  key distribution problem in 
MWSNs, some schemes designed for static networks can be applied to mobile networks 
to some extent such as [36] and [37]. The approach proposed in [38] use assisting nodes 
to distribute keys to sensor nodes. However, this scheme requires too many assisting 
nodes to achieve a high level of connectivity. Another study [39] proposes a key 
establishment scheme for MWSNs using the post deployment knowledge of sensor 
nodes. In this study, each key unit is mapped to a location before deployment. After 
deployment, sensor nodes determine their post-deployment locations and each node 
computes the distance between its post-deployment location and the locations 
associated with the keys. Next, keys are prioritized according to their distance: smaller 
distance keys have higher priority. Two nodes can communicate by using their common 
high priority keys. This study assumes that the sensor node locations are known through 
a location finding system such as GPS. Moreover, it requires a high amount of 
additional memory to achieve a reasonable connectivity level. The scheme proposed in 
[40] uses mobile base stations operating as key distribution centers. In this scheme, 
nodes are not preloaded with keys. After the deployment, base station moves among the 
nodes, generates and distributes pairwise keys to sensor nodes. This scheme is perfectly 
resilient to node capture attacks. Because each node pair uses a different key, node 
capture does not reveal any of the keys used in the rest of the network. 
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2.4.  Need for Mobile WSNs  
There are many studies in literature, that shows the importance of mobility in 
WSNs. Firstly, it is shown that using mobile entities in a sensor network improves the 
coverage area [41, 42]. Because the initial deployment of WSNs is usually done by 
scattering the sensor nodes from a plane or vehicle, complete coverage of whole area 
may not be guaranteed after initial deployment. Moreover, optimal initial deployment of 
nodes may not be known in many cases. Hence, mobility of nodes can be used to 
rearrange the network after deployment [43]. Mobility also becomes useful when some 
nodes in the network die due to their limited battery power or environmental conditions. 
Replacing or recharging these nodes may be difficult in many cases [44]. Mobile nodes 
can cover the holes in network, which are caused by the dead nodes.  
Secondly, WSNs need to support various different missions. In many of these 
missions, such as battlefield surveillance, object tracking etc., sensor nodes are required 
to be mobile. In these conditions, mobile sensor nodes provide enhanced target tracking 
and better efficiency [45]. 
2.5.  Mobility Models 
There are many different mobility models proposed for MWSNs. These models 
can be categorized as the entity based models and group based models. In the entity 
based models sensor nodes move individually, whereas in the group based models each 
sensor node belongs to a group and move together with that group.  The survey by 
Camp, Boleng and Davies [46] is one of the most important studies on mobility models 
in literature. This study concludes that performance of an ad hoc network can vary 
significantly with different mobility models. Also, during the performance evaluations, 
chosen mobility model should closely match the expected real-world scenario. These 
conclusions are also valid for MWSNs, as shown in [44, 45]. Considering these 
conclusions and following the recommendations in [46], we chose the Random Walk 
Mobility Model for entity based mobility and the Reference Point Group Mobility 
Model (RPGM) for group based mobility in our simulations.  The implementations of 
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these mobility models are downloaded from http://toilers.mines.edu and they are 
modified according to the requirements of our study. 
2.5.1.  Random Walk Mobility Model 
In this model, nodes randomly choose a direction and speed from predefined 
ranges, [speedmin; speedmax] and [0;2] respectively [46]. They move in that direction 
for a constant travel time or a constant distance, and then choose a different direction 
and speed. In our implementation, each node moves for one minute before they choose 
a different direction and speed.  
2.5.2.  Reference Point Group Mobility Model 
RPGM model is said to be a generic method for group mobility, because various 
other group mobility models, such as the Nomadic Community and Pursue Mobility 
models, can be implemented by changing the input parameters of this model [46].  
In RPGM model, a node is chosen as a logical center within each group. This 
node is also called the group reference point. Group center chooses a random 
destination point and starts moving to that destination with a randomly chosen speed. 
Other nodes in the group have individual reference points, updated according to the 
movement of group reference point. The nodes start to move to a randomly chosen 
point, which is in a predefined radius of their reference point. In our implementation, 
reference point of a node can be at most 70 meters away from the group reference point. 
Moreover, the random point chosen by the node can be at most one meter away from its 
own reference point. After the group center (group reference point) reaches its 
destination, it selects a new destination and all other nodes in the group move 
accordingly. 
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3. OUR SCHEME: DYNAMIC KEYRING UPDATE MECHANISM 
In this section, we present our Dynamic Keyring Update (DKRU) mechanism for 
mobile wireless sensor networks. Our mechanism can be used together with different 
key predistribution schemes and it can be considered as an extension to the shared key 
discovery phase. The main purpose of our mechanism is to enable a sensor node to 
periodically update its keyring according to its neighbors. After each time the shared 
key discovery phase is performed, a node determines on a set of keys which are 
frequent among its neighbors, and requests the transmission of these keys from a base 
station.  As a result, during the next shared key discovery phase, the probability of 
sharing common keys with neighbors increases for each sensor node. 
The application process of DKRU mechanism can be examined in five steps for 
better explanation. A general overview of DKRU mechanism is given in Figure 3.1. 
These steps will also be explained in reference to the pseudo code in Figure 3.2. The list 
of symbols we use in our mechanism is provided in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of DKRU mechanism 
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Table 3.1 List of symbols used in our DKRU mechanism 
   Sensor node i 
      Pairwise key shared between node i and base station (BS) 
   List of the Most  Frequent Keys belonging to node i 
   Key Transfer List belonging to node i 
   List of Remembered Keys belonging to node i 
  Size of the keyring  
  
Minimum number of common  keys required for two neighboring nodes to 
establish a secure communication (a parameter for  -composite scheme)   
   
Number of frequent key IDs added to Key Transfer List from 1-hop 
neighbors 
  Probability for adding a frequent key ID to Key Transfer List 
     
Maximum number of keys that a sensor node can transfer from the base 
station at one time (Maximum Transfer Count ) 
   Node connectivity threshold for key transfer decision 
   Maximum size for List of Remembered Keys 
   Usage count threshold for deletion of keys 
 
 
 
1- Nodes and base stations are predistributed with keys. Then they are deployed to the 
deployment  area.   
2- During the movement of nodes, the following steps are executed periodically: 
 3- Shared key discovery phase is performed. 
 4- Sensor node pairs, who share at least   common keys, establish a secure 
 communication using all their shared keys.   
 5- For each node   ; 
  6- The Most Frequent Keys list (    is formed and sorted in decreasing order. 
  7- Starting with the first key in   ,    number of keys are added to Key Transfer 
  List (   , each with a probability of  . 
  8-    list is sent to neighboring nodes and their lists are received.  
  9- According to the   lists coming from neighbors and the Remembered Keys  
  list (  ),    list is updated.    
  10- If the size of    list is greater than     , some of the keys in    list are  
  deleted randomly, until the size of the list becomes equal to      .  
  11- Keys that exceed the usage count (  ) are deleted from keyring.  
  12- Node connectivity is calculated. 
   12.a- If node connectivity is below the    threshold, the keys in    list  
   will be transferred; 
    12.a.i- If there is not enough space in keyring for the transfer of  
    new keys, some of the current keys are  deleted, starting with  
    the earliest used ones.   
    12.a.ii- The keys in     list are transferred from the Base Station. 
   12.b- If node connectivity is above the    threshold, the keys in     list  
   are added to the    list. If the size of     list becomes greater than   ,  
   the oldest keys in    list are deleted, until enough space is opened for  
   the latest remembered keys. 
  13-    and    lists are cleared.  
Figure 3.2 Pseudo code for DKRU mechanism 
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3.1.  Key Predistribution and Deployment 
In this phase, sensor nodes are initialized and keys are distributed to each node 
before deployment. For key distribution, any chosen key predistribution model can be 
used. In addition, base stations share preloaded pairwise keys with each sensor node and 
they store all the keys of the global key pool in their memory. The pairwise key between 
node i and a base station is denoted as      . 
After the key predistribution phase, nodes and base stations are deployed. This 
part covers the steps 1 to 4 in Figure 3.2. 
3.2.  Forming the Key Transfer List 
After deployment, sensor nodes try to communicate by performing the shared key 
discovery phase periodically. In shared key discovery phase, sensor nodes broadcast the 
key IDs in their keyrings to see if they share any common keys with their neighbors. 
Consequently, a node learns the IDs of all keys that exist in its neighbors' keyrings. 
Using this information, a node can easily calculate the frequency of each key that is 
found in its neighbors' keyrings, but not found in its own keyring. The IDs of these keys 
constitute the List of the Most Frequent  Keys (  ) for this node. Then, these frequencies 
are sorted in decreasing order. Starting with the most frequent key, a node selects    
number of keys for its Key Transfer List (  ). Each key is selected with a probability of 
 . In this initial state,     list consists of the frequent keys that are found in   's 1-hop 
neighbors.  This part corresponds to steps 6 and 7 in Figure 3.2. 
After nodes establish their initial Key Transfer Lists, they broadcast these lists to 
their neighbors. In this way, nodes can learn the frequent keys found in their 2-hop 
neighbors. Nodes have a high probability of meeting with their 2-hop neighbors in the 
future steps, so this broadcast operation can be considered as an investment for the 
future. The IDs of unique frequent keys coming from the 2-hop neighbors are added to 
   list.  
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At this point, number of key IDs in    list may be more than the allowed 
Maximum Transfer Count (    ). In this case, some of these key IDs are deleted 
randomly, until the Maximum Transfer Count is reached. The reason for adding 
randomness to the process of forming Key Transfer List is to prevent the transfer of 
same set of keys repeatedly. If the transfer lists become repetitive, many of the links are 
secured by the same set of keys, which will deteriorate the resiliency of the network. 
Another precaution against repetitive transfer lists is to have a List of Remembered 
Keys (  ) in each node. While forming the    list, the keys in    list are also checked 
and these keys are certainly excluded from    list. The detailed usage of    list will be 
explained in the next subsection. The steps 8, 9 and 10 in Figure 3.2 corresponds the 
process of finalizing the Key Transfer List for each node. 
3.3.  Deciding on Key Transfer 
After a node forms its Key Transfer List, it decides whether it needs to transfer 
these keys or not, according to its node connectivity. Node connectivity is the ratio of 
number of neighbors with which a node shares common keys over the number of all 
neighbors. This ratio can easily be calculated at the end of the shared key discovery 
phase. If the connectivity of a node is less than a threshold value (  ), this node 
requests the transfer of new keys from the base station. However, if connectivity of a 
node is greater than the    threshold, it does not transfer any keys. Instead, the key IDs 
in its Key Transfer List (  ) are added to the List of Remembered Keys (  ). Node 
remembers these keys because when forming the Key Transfer List next time, these 
keys will be excluded even if they are among the most frequent keys. The purpose of 
List of Remembered Keys is again to prevent the transmission of same set of keys 
repeatedly. If size of the    list has already reached its maximum value (  ), then 
enough number of keys are deleted from    list, starting with the oldest ones. In this 
way, the latest remembered keys are prioritized.  This part covers the step 12 in Figure 
3.2, excluding 12.a.i and 12.a.ii, which will be explained in following subsections. 
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3.4.  Key Deletion Process 
Another property of our DKRU mechanism is that the size of the keyring of a 
node never exceeds the predefined keyring size  . Before a node transfers new keys, it 
deletes the required number of existing keys. Key deletion process has two steps. For 
the first step, each node stores  key usage count values for all of its keys. Key usage 
count is calculated as the number of times a key is used in securing links. Keys are 
deleted if their usage count exceeds a predefined threshold (  ). This step is executed 
regardless of the key transfer decision, because keys whose usage counts exceed the 
threshold are not allowed to be used in any links again. After this step, if the node is 
going to transfer new keys and if it does not have enough space in its keyring, then it 
deletes some of its existing keys starting with the earliest used ones, until enough space 
is created for new keys. Key transfer operation is performed after the key deletion 
process. Hence, keyring size can never exceed   . The steps 11 and 12.a.i in Figure 3.2 
corresponds to this key deletion process. 
3.5.  Performing Key Transfer 
When a sensor node wants to request the keys in its    list from the base station, 
the node encrypts the requested key IDs with key       and sends this message to the 
base station. Base station sends these keys to sensor node again by encrypting them with 
key      . The number of keys that a sensor node can request from the base station at 
the end of each shared key discovery phase cannot exceed the  Maximum Transfer 
Count (    ). This part corresponds to the step 12.a.ii in Figure 3.2.  
After the key transfer operation is performed, or the keys in     list are added to 
the    list; node prepares itself for the next shared key discovery phase by clearing the 
   and    lists.  
The main assumptions of this mechanism are as follows. Base stations are tamper-
proof and they cannot be captured by an attacker. In addition, we assumed that each 
node can directly communicate with a base station in its communication range. These 
assumptions require a powerful base station with high memory capacity and large 
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communication range. The number of base stations needed depends on the wireless 
communication range of the base stations and the area of the deployment zone. 
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4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
We evaluated the performance of DKRU mechanism by applying it to two 
different key predistribution schemes, which are the basic scheme [3] and Du's scheme 
[6]. In this section, we first define the threat model and metrics we used for performance 
evaluations. Then, we explain how we incorporate the key predistribution schemes with 
mobility models. Finally, we present the detailed evaluation results of our mechanism 
when it is used together with basic scheme and Du's scheme respectively.    
4.1.  Threat Model 
Security of a symmetric key cryptosystem rely on the secrecy of the key it uses 
[7]. If an attacker learns the key and intercepts the encrypted messages, he/she can 
decrypt these messages easily and confidentiality of system is destroyed. An important 
problem for WSNs is that, because sensor nodes are vulnerable to physical capture 
attacks, an attacker can easily retrieve all the keying material stored in a sensor node. 
Then, attacker can use these keys to decrypt the eavesdropped communications.  
4.2.  Performance Metrics 
To evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we use four different 
performance metrics, which are global connectivity, local connectivity, resiliency and 
communication overhead. These metrics are explained in following subsections in 
detail. 
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4.2.1.  Global Connectivity 
Wireless Sensor Networks can also be viewed as key-sharing graphs where nodes 
are the vertices and secure links are the edges. Global connectivity is defined as the 
ratio of the size of the largest isolated component in this graph to the size of the whole 
network [6]. Nodes that are not connected to largest isolated component are considered 
as disconnected from the secure network. Hence, it is important to have high global 
connectivity in a network.  
4.2.2.  Local Connectivity 
We define local connectivity as the probability of two neighboring nodes being 
able to find at least 2 common keys to establish a secure communication link between 
them. Path key establishment phase is not taken into consideration in the computation of 
local connectivity, due to its high communication overhead. Hence, it is important for a 
network to achieve good local connectivity using shared key discovery phase alone. 
Moreover, path key establishment phase should be avoided in MWSNs because it 
involves much more communication and computational overheads compared to static 
WSNs [39].  
Connectivity of a random key predistribution scheme is directly proportional to 
the keyring size of nodes. As the keyring size increases, each node gets more keys from 
the global key pool and probability that two nodes share common keys also increases. 
However, there is always a limitation on the keyring size, because sensor nodes have 
restricted memory capacity. Moreover, increasing keyring size too much deteriorates 
the resiliency of network. This issue will be explained in the next subsection. 
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4.2.3.  Resiliency 
One of the most important security threats for WSNs is the physical capture of 
sensor nodes by an attacker. Because the sensor nodes are not tamper proof, the attacker 
can access the keyrings of sensor nodes and decrypt their communication. Moreover, 
these compromised keys may be used in communication links of non-captured nodes, 
too. In this case, the attacker can also decrypt the communications among non-captured 
nodes. Resiliency of a network is inversely proportional to the amount of compromised 
links between non-captured nodes. In resiliency analysis, it is assumed that when an 
attacker captures a node, it retrieves all the keys in the node's keyring. Also, attacker has 
the ability to eavesdrop all message exchanges in the network. However, our attack 
model does not involve an active attacker who manipulates captured nodes to do further 
actions. In our simulations, attacker captures one node in each minute. Then we 
compute the ratio of additionally compromised links due to these node captures. 
Resiliency of a random key predistribution scheme is inversely proportional to the 
keyring size of nodes. As the keyring size increases, more keys become compromised 
when a node is captured by an attacker. Consequently, these compromised keys give 
attacker the opportunity to decrypt more communication links among non-captured 
nodes. On the other hand, decreasing keyring size to provide higher network resiliency 
is not always a good solution, because it reduces the local and global connectivity of 
network.  Hence, random key predistribution schemes always have a trade-off between 
connectivity and resiliency. 
4.2.4.  Communication Overhead 
Communication overhead is defined as the average number of bytes sent and 
received by a node at each shared key discovery phase. Without the Dynamic Keyring 
Update mechanism, a node sends/receives all of the key IDs to/from its neighbors for 
the shared key discovery phase. However, using Dynamic Keyring Update mechanism 
results in additional communications. Firstly, nodes send the key IDs in their initial Key 
Transfer Lists to their neighbors and receive the key IDs from their neighbors.    
parameter affects the communication overhead of this step. Secondly, if a node is going 
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to perform key transfer, it sends the requested key IDs to the base station and receives 
the encrypted keys.      parameter is important here because it determines how many 
keys will be requested from the base station. In our computations, we considered 4-byte 
key IDs and 32-byte keys.  
4.3.  Incorporation of Mobility Models into Key Pre-Distribution Schemes 
To understand the behavior of key predistribution schemes in Mobile WSNs, we 
should first understand the behavior of different mobility models with different initial 
deployment types. To be able to see the effects of mobility models, we visualized the 
network for a limited number of nodes. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate the 
node locations at two specific times: beginning of the simulation (   ) and end of the 
simulation (     ). These figures indicate that the initial deployment model and the 
chosen mobility model have significant impact on the operation of sensor network. 
Please note that, because the number of nodes used in performance evaluation 
simulations are very high, it is difficult to visualize the network with that many number 
of nodes. Thus, we used 500 nodes for basic scheme and 900 nodes for Du's scheme in 
this visualization process.  
4.3.1.  Basic Scheme 
For the basic scheme, there is no specific initial deployment model because key 
predistribution is done randomly. Thus, we can deploy the nodes according to the 
related mobility model.  
For the Random Walk mobility model, node deployment follows a uniform 
random distribution in the deployment area. Figure 4.1 shows that there is no specific 
pattern in node deployment. The distribution of nodes looks similar both at the 
beginning of the simulation and at the end of the simulation.  
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Figure 
 
Figure 4.1 Visualization of Random Walk Mobility Model with Basic Scheme 
 
For the initial deployment of RPGM model, firstly the group reference point is 
deployed to a random point in deployment area. Then, other nodes in the group are 
placed within in a predefined range of the group center, again randomly.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the initial and final locations of 5 different node groups. As we 
can see, these node groups are in very different locations at the end of the simulation. 
Moreover, some of these groups seem to be merged because they move close to each 
other during the simulation.  
    
 
 
Figure 4.2 Visualization of RPGM Model with Basic Scheme 
 
t = 0 t = 200 
t = 0 t = 200 
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4.3.2.  Du's Scheme 
Because Du's Scheme uses deployment knowledge in key predistribution, it 
follows a specific initial deployment model. Thus, we used the grid pattern in initial 
deployment, regardless of the mobility model. Our simulation area consists of 100 grid 
cells, each with a size of 100x100 meters. At each grid cell, a node group consisting of 
100 nodes is deployed following a two dimensional Gaussian distribution. The center of 
each grid cell becomes the deployment point. The standard deviation parameter for 
Gaussian distribution is set to 50 meters, which means most of the sensor nodes of a 
group will be within 50 meters range of the center of the grid cell. For visualization 
purposes, we deployed 9 groups to the area and analyzed the mobility models in Figures 
4.3 and 4.4.  
Figure 4.3 shows the behavior of Random Walk mobility model. Because the 
sensor nodes move individually and choose new direction and speed at each minute, 
they tend to stay in the same neighborhood. As time progresses, nodes start to spread 
over the simulation area.   
     
 
k 
 
Figure 4.3 Visualization of Random Walk Mobility Model with Du's Scheme 
 
RPGM model, on the other hand, behaves differently than the Random Walk 
model. Because all nodes in a group move according to the group reference point, 
groups get separated quickly and start to move in random directions. As we can see in 
Figure 4.4, node groups may end up in different places at the end of the simulation. 
Moreover, some node groups may merge into each other during the simulation.  
t = 0 t = 200 
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Figure 4.4 Visualization of RPGM Model with Du's Scheme 
4.4.  Using Basic Scheme As Key Pre-Distribution Basis 
In this part, we used basic scheme [3] together with  
 -composite scheme [24] as the key predistribution basis for sensor nodes. In key 
predistribution phase, a certain number of keys ( ) are randomly chosen from a global 
key pool for each sensor node.  Then, these keys are loaded to nodes, forming their 
keyrings. In addition, base stations share a pairwise key with each sensor node and they 
are loaded with all the keys of the global key pool.   value for the  -composite scheme 
is set to 2, which means at least two common keys are required for secure 
communication of two nodes. 
After all the keys are distributed, sensor nodes are deployed to the field according 
to the related mobility model, as described earlier.  
The performance of our mechanism is evaluated via simulations, using C# for 
code development.  A comparative analysis of basic scheme with and without our 
Dynamic Keyring Update mechanism is given in following subsections. For a fair 
comparison, we measured performance of basic scheme with two different   values. 
Both random walk and RPGM mobility models are evaluated separately in each 
subsection.  The common parameters and system configuration are as follows. 
 The number of sensor nodes in the network is 10,000. 
 Deployment area is 1,000 x 1,000 square meters. 
t = 0 t = 200 
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 Size of the global key pool is 100,000. 
 Wireless communication range of sensor nodes is 40 m. 
 For mobility models, minimum and maximum speed of nodes are 5 and 15 
meters/minute respectively. 
Additional parameters are given in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 List of other parameters used in simulations 
 Basic scheme  DKRU with 
RPGM 
DKRU with  
Random walk 
  300 and 475 300 300 
   - 3 3 
  - 0.6 0.6 
     - 10 10 
   - 0.9 0.9 
   - 80 80 
   - 50 40 
4.4.1.  Local Connectivity Analysis 
In basic scheme, keys are distributed randomly to sensor nodes. Therefore, a node 
shares common keys with any other node with equal probability, regardless of their 
coordinates in deployment area. For this reason, mobility of nodes do not significantly 
affect the local connectivity performance of basic scheme. As it can be seen from Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7, local connectivity value of basic scheme is approximately 0.22 when =300 
for both mobility models.  
Adding DKRU mechanism to basic scheme increases local connectivity 
approximately to 0.66, while the keyring size does not change. In other words, DKRU 
mechanism provides three-times better local connectivity with the same number of keys 
in keyrings of nodes. This increase is valid for both mobility models, as shown in 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6. 
Another important issue about DKRU mechanism is the time it requires to reach a 
steady-state local connectivity. Because keyring size is 300, its local connectivity ratio 
starts with 0.22, which is same as the basic scheme with 300 keys. Then, as the key 
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transfer operation is performed, local connectivity starts to increase. Once node 
connectivity of many of the nodes exceeds the 0.9 threshold, they stop transferring keys 
for a while. When node connectivity drops again, nodes start to perform key transfer. 
This process causes the fluctuations that are observed at the beginning of the simulation 
results.  
To be able to make a fair comparison on the resiliency of basic scheme and 
DKRU mechanism, we used same local connectivity in both schemes. To do this, we 
increased the keyring size of basic scheme to 475 keys. In this case, basic scheme also 
achieves a local connectivity around 0.66 for both mobility models, as seen in Figures 
4.5 and 4.6. In other words, basic scheme requires an increase of 175 keys in keyring 
size to achieve the same local connectivity with DKRU mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Local connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
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Figure 4.6 Local connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
4.4.2.  Global Connectivity Analysis 
When we analyze the global connectivity of basic scheme for RPGM and Random 
Walk mobility models (as shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8), we can see that for both values 
of  , network have almost perfect global connectivity. Using DKRU mechanism also 
gives similar connectivity values.  
In Figure 4.7, however, there are some minor decreases in global connectivity for 
certain time periods. These decreases are due to the underlying RPGM model. In RPGM 
model, node groups move independently and sometimes, some of these groups may 
move away from others and get out of the communication range of the largest isolated 
component of network. In this case, even if the nodes in these groups share common 
keys with other nodes, they cannot form any kind of communication links and global 
connectivity decreases. When these isolated groups get close to the rest of the network 
again, global connectivity also recovers to its original value. In random walk mobility 
model each node moves individually and randomly, so this mobility model does not 
result in isolated components in network.  
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Figure 4.7 Global connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Global connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
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4.4.3.  Resiliency Analysis 
 We make a comparative analysis of basic scheme with and without DKRU 
mechanism in terms of network resiliency. We make the analysis from two 
perspectives; fixed keyring size and fixed local connectivity. 
a) Fixed keyring size ( =300) 
When the keyring size is fixed for basic scheme and DKRU mechanism, the latter 
achieves a much higher local connectivity compared to the former.  Moreover, DKRU 
mechanism does not worsen the resiliency of network. Actually, it even brings about a 
slight improvement to resiliency. As Figures 4.9 and 4.10 demonstrate, additionally 
compromised links ratio for DKRU mechanism is around 0.13 at the end of the 
simulation, whereas this ratio is around 0.17 for basic scheme when same number of 
keys are used. Both mobility models show similar results.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for RPGM model when 
keyring size is fixed 
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Figure 4.10 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for random walk mobility 
model when keyring size is fixed 
 
b) Fixed local connectivity 
When the local connectivity of network is fixed to 0.66, basic scheme requires the 
keyring size to be 475. In this case, additionally compromised links ratio of basic 
scheme increases approximately to 0.25 at the end of the simulations for both mobility 
models, as shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12. For the same local connectivity level, 
additionally compromised links ratio of DKRU mechanism raises only to 0.13 for both 
mobility models. In other words, DKRU mechanism provides higher network resiliency 
when local connectivity of basic scheme and DKRU mechanism are at the same level.  
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Figure 4.11 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for RPGM model when 
local connectivity is fixed 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for random walk mobility 
model when local connectivity is fixed 
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4.4.4.  Communication Overhead Analysis 
As stated earlier, the shared key discovery phase of basic scheme introduces some 
communication overhead due to the exchange of key IDs with neighboring nodes. 
DKRU mechanism increases this overhead with the broadcast of initial key transfer lists 
and key transfer operations.    and      parameters affect the additional overhead of 
DKRU mechanism. In our simulations,    parameter is set to 3 and      parameter is 
set to 10. Once again, we considered the key IDs as 4 bytes and  keys as 32 bytes.  
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 shows the communication overhead results for RPGM and 
random walk mobility models. Communication overhead of RPGM model is generally 
higher than the random walk mobility model, because in RPGM model nodes in each 
node group move closely to each other. Consequently, a node has more neighboring 
nodes in its communication range. This increases the number of bytes sent and received 
during the shared key discovery phase.  
As it can be seen in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, communication overhead of our 
mechanism is very close to the communication overhead of basic scheme when the 
keyring size  is set to 300 in both schemes. The reason is that,    and      parameters 
do not require high values in our mechanism. As an example,    parameter is set to 3, 
which means that a sensor node sends 3 additional key IDs to each of its neighbors and 
receives 3 additional key IDs from each of its neighbors. In terms of communication 
overhead, this process corresponds to increasing the node's keyring size by 3. Besides, 
     parameter is set to 10, which results in additional communication overhead of 320 
bytes. Moreover, key transfer operation is performed only if node connectivity is below 
the    threshold. Hence, additional communication overhead due to key transfer does 
not always occur. 
When DKRU mechanism is compared to basic scheme with keyring size of 475 
keys, it can be seen that communication overhead of DKRU mechanism is much less 
than the basic scheme. In other words, when local connectivity of DKRU mechanism 
and basic scheme are at the same level, DKRU mechanism is more advantageous in 
terms of communication cost. This result is an expected one because DKRU mechanism 
achieves this local connectivity level with only 300 keys, whereas basic scheme requires 
475 keys for the same level. Hence, at each shared key discovery phase of basic 
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scheme, sensor nodes send/receive additional 175 key IDs to/from each of their 
neighbors. This result also shows the importance of keyring size for the communication 
cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Communication overhead versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Communication overhead versus time for random walk mobility model 
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4.5.  Using Du's Scheme As Key Pre-Distribution Basis 
In this part, we used Du's scheme [6] together with  
 -composite scheme [24] as the key predistribution basis for sensor nodes. Sensor nodes 
are divided into equally-sized groups  and a group key pool is prepared for each group. 
Keys in group key pools are selected from a global key pool, considering the 
neighboring relations of groups after deployment. Then, a certain number of keys ( ) 
are distributed randomly to each sensor node, from the related group key pool.    value 
is set to 2, which means at least 2 common keys are required for secure communication 
of two nodes. Moreover, base stations are loaded with all the keys of the global key 
pool and they share pairwise keys with each sensor node. 
After the key predistribution phase, nodes and base stations are deployed to 
simulation environment, as described earlier in Section 4.3.  
The performance of our Dynamic Keyring Update mechanism, when it is applied 
to Du's scheme is given in following subsections. We evaluate both the random walk 
and RPGM mobility models and compare the performance of DKRU mechanism and 
Du's scheme.  The common parameters and system configuration used in simulations 
are as follows:  
 The number of sensor nodes in the network is 10,000. 
 Deployment area is 1,000 x 1,000 square meters. 
 Deployment area is divided into a grid of 10 x 10 cells and each cell has a group of 
100 nodes in initial deployment.  
 Area of each grid cell is 100x100 square meters. 
 Size of the global key pool is 100,000. 
 Size of the key pool for each group of nodes is 1789. 
 Two  horizontally and vertically neighboring key pools share exactly  0.2x1789 keys. 
 Two  diagonally neighboring key pools share exactly  0.05x1789 keys. 
 Two non-neighboring key pools share no keys. 
 Wireless communication range of sensor nodes is 40 meters. 
 Nodes are deployed to the grid cells using two dimensional Gaussian distribution. 
 For mobility models, minimum and maximum speed of nodes are 5 and 15 
meters/minute respectively. 
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Additional parameters are given in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 List of other parameters used in simulations 
 Du's scheme DKRU with RPGM DKRU with  
Random walk 
  300 300 300 
   - 3 3 
  - 0.6 0.6 
     - 10 10 
   - 0.9 0.9 
   - 80 80 
   - 200 150 
4.5.1.  Global Connectivity Analysis 
When global connectivity of Du's scheme is examined for Reference Point Group 
Mobility model (Figure 4.15), it can be seen that even the network is fully connected at 
the beginning, in a short amount of time, only 10% of the network remains connected. 
This major decline results from the fact that two non-neighboring key pools do not 
share any keys in Du's scheme.  When the initially non-neighboring groups become 
neighbors due to mobility, they cannot communicate and each group forms its own 
isolated component, which constitutes only 10% of the network.  Our mechanism fixes 
this issue because nodes update their keyrings according to their new neighbors. In 
Figure 4.15, it can be seen that our mechanism provides almost perfect network 
connectivity for RPGM model.   
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Figure 4.15 Global connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
 
In the random walk mobility model, global connectivity does not decrease significantly 
for Du's scheme. The reason is that because each node selects a new direction and speed 
periodically and randomly, they mostly stay in the same neighborhood. Their 
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cells. Because the key pools of these cells have some overlapping, nodes can continue 
to establish secure links between them. As shown in Figure 4.16, our mechanism also 
provides almost perfect global connectivity for this mobility model.  
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Figure 4.16 Global connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
4.5.2.  Local Connectivity Analysis 
Despite the fact that location based key distribution schemes provide better local 
connectivity than the probabilistic schemes for static WSNs, same situation is not valid 
for MWSNs. In Figures 4.17 and 4.18, it can be seen that the local connectivity of Du's 
scheme decreases from 90% to 30% over time for both mobility models. This decrease 
is sharper for RPGM model because neighboring relationships break off faster in this 
model.  When the DKRU mechanism is added to Du's scheme, local connectivity can be 
improved to 60% in steady state, without requiring any increase in keyring size. 
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Figure 4.17 Local connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Local connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
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4.5.3.  Resiliency Analysis 
For the RPGM model, Du's scheme has very low global and local connectivity. 
Due to this low connectivity of network, it is hard to make judgments about the 
resiliency of network. As shown in Figure 4.19,  additionally compromised links ratio 
for Du's scheme is close to zero after 200 minutes of simulation. However, this does not 
indicate that the network is resilient. Actually, this indicates that there are not enough 
links in the network to be compromised. On the other hand, our mechanism provides 
high local and global connectivity for this mobility model. Despite this high 
connectivity, additionally compromised links ratio reaches only to 0.1 in our 
mechanism. This means, about 90% of the communication links between non-captured 
nodes are still secure.  
 
 
Figure 4.19 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for RPGM model 
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Figure 4.20 Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for random walk mobility 
model 
4.5.4.  Communication Overhead Analysis 
As it can be seen in Figures 4.21 and 4.22, communication overhead of our 
mechanism is very close to the communication overhead of Du's scheme for both 
mobility models. Our mechanism does not introduce a significant increase in 
communication overhead, because values given to the    and      parameters bring 
about a limited amount of communication cost. 
Figures 4.21 and 4.22 also show that the communication overhead is higher in the 
RPGM model compared to the random walk mobility model. The reason is that, when 
nodes move together as a group, they have more neighbors in their communication 
range. Consequently, in the shared key discovery phase, they send and receive higher 
number of key IDs. Moreover, when two groups get close to each other during their 
movement, nodes can have even more neighbors in their communication range. 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 A
d
d
it
io
n
al
ly
 C
o
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 L
in
ks
 
R
at
io
 
Time (minutes) 
DKRU mechanism Du's scheme 
 46  
 
 
Figure 4.21 Communication overhead versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22 Communication overhead versus time for random walk mobility model 
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4.6.  Choosing Simulation Parameters 
Our DKRU mechanism has a number of parameters that affect its performance 
and need to be chosen carefully. These parameters are probability of adding a frequent 
key ID to Key Transfer List ( ), maximum transfer count (    ), maximum key usage 
count (  ) and node connectivity threshold (  ). These parameters can be selected 
according to the key predistribution basis and requirements of the network. To be able 
to find out to the optimal parameters for each key predistibution basis and mobility 
model, we perform unit analyses on the parameters. In this section, we explain how the 
parameters of our scheme affect its performance and how we chose the optimal 
parameters.  
 Probability of adding a frequent key ID to Key Transfer List ( ): After a node forms 
its Most Frequent Keys list (   , it selects    number of keys from this list to form 
its initial Key Transfer List (   .  As the   parameter  increases, a node has more 
chance to transfer the keys with higher frequency. This decreases the randomness in 
the keyrings, because frequent keys become more frequent, and after a while, all 
nodes start to use the same set of keys. However, connectivity of network should not 
depend on a set of keys, because this decreases network resiliency. Hence,   
parameter should not be set to a very high value. Also, it should not be less than 0.5 
because otherwise the keys with lower frequencies have more chance to join the    
list of a node. To prioritize the frequent keys in transferring operation without losing 
the randomness of keyrings, we set the   parameter to 0.6 in our simulations. 
 Maximum transfer count (    ): This parameter limits the number of keys that can 
be transferred to a node after each shared key discovery phase. In other words, it 
determines the maximum size of    list. Increasing      parameter improves 
connectivity because a node gets more keys which are frequent among its neighbors. 
However, increasing      also causes higher communication overhead because 
transferring more keys is a more costly operation. Our empirical studies show that 
setting      parameter to 10 is enough to increase connectivity without causing high 
communication overhead.  
 Maximum key usage count (  ): This parameter is one of the most important 
parameters that affect the connectivity of network. When    parameter is low, each 
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key is used in only a few links and then deleted. This decreases network 
connectivity and causes fluctuations in connectivity level because keys used in 
communication links are deleted quickly. If the node density is high in a network, 
   parameter should also be raised to increase the lifespan of keys. Therefore in our 
simulations,    parameter has higher values in Reference Point Group mobility 
model, compared to Random Walk mobility model. The values for    parameter  in 
different network settings are chosen empirically to minimize the fluctuations in 
connectivity level of network. 
 Node connectivity threshold (  ): Key transfer decision of nodes depends on this 
parameter. Decreasing this threshold also decreases the connectivity of the network 
because nodes do not transfer new keys frequently. However, when    threshold is 
set to 1, it means that a node always requests the transfer of new keys, even if it can 
communicate with all of its neighbors. This may cause unnecessary communication 
overhead because if a node is already connected, it does not need new keys. 
Moreover, transferring new keys unnecessarily decreases the randomness of 
keyrings. Thus, we set the    threshold to 0.9 in our simulations. 
 Remembered keys count (  ): If a node decides not to transfer the keys in its Key 
Transfer List (   , it adds these keys to Remembered Keys list (  ). Keys in    list 
are excluded from the    list when it is being prepared. Hence, as long as a key stays 
in    list, it cannot be transferred.    parameter determines the maximum size of    
list. As an example, if    is set to 80 and      is set to 10, a key in    list needs 8 
rounds of negative key transfer decision to leave the    list. Decreasing    
parameter deteriorates the resiliency of network, because same set of keys starts to 
circulate in the Key Transfer Lists of nodes.  
4.7.  Detailed Analysis of q Value 
In our performance evaluations, we used the basic scheme [3] and Du's scheme 
[6] as different key predistribution bases. As in [24], we require   common keys for two 
nodes to establish a secure link between them.  We set the   value to 2, which means 
that a node pair needs at least 2 common keys to form a secure direct link.  This 
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approach increases the resiliency of network, however it decreases connectivity because 
more common keys are required to form direct secure communication links.  
Another disadvantage of this approach is that, as the   value increases, network 
becomes more vulnerable to large-scale attacks. When a small amount of nodes are 
captured, the adversary can decrypt little number of links with the compromised keys. 
However, when large number of nodes are compromised, larger fractions of network are 
revealed to adversary [24].  
To find the optimal   value for our mechanism, we evaluated its performance for 
different   values. In this evaluation, we fixed the local connectivity of network to 
approximately 65% and we compared the resiliency values when   is equal to 1, 2, 3 
and 4. Our mechanism provides almost perfect global connectivity in all cases, so we do 
not consider global connectivity metric in this comparison. To fix the local connectivity, 
we sometimes used different parameters for different   values. Our results for two 
different key predistribution bases (DKRU with basic scheme and DKRU with Du's 
scheme) and two different mobility models are as follows. 
1. DKRU with basic scheme 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 give the parameters used to fix the local connectivity of 
network to 65% for different   values. As it can be seen in Table 4.3, node connectivity 
(  ) threshold is lower when   is equal to 1 in Random Walk Mobility model, 
compared to other    values. The reason is that, local connectivity of network is already 
close to 60% when   is equal to 1, and neighborhood of nodes does not significantly 
change in Random Walk mobility model. Hence, nodes do not need to transfer new 
keys frequently to achieve 65% local connectivity.  
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Table 4.3 Parameters for different   values when DKRU mechanism is used with basic 
scheme and Random Walk mobility model 
 DKRU with basic scheme 
  = 1   = 2   = 3   = 4 
  300 300 300 300 
   3 3 3 3 
  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
     10 10 10 10 
   0.55 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   80 80 80 80 
   40 40 40 40 
 
Table 4.4 Parameters for different   values when DKRU mechanism is used with basic 
scheme and RPGM model 
 DKRU with basic scheme 
  = 1   = 2   = 3   = 4 
  300 300 300 300 
   3 3 3 3 
  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
     10 10 10 10 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   80 80 80 80 
   50 50 50 50 
 
Figures 4.23 and 4.24 show the additionally compromised links ratios for different 
mobility models.  These figures demonstrate that the best resiliency value is achieved 
when   is equal to 2. For larger values of  , DKRU with basic scheme suffers from the 
abovementioned disadvantage of requiring at least   keys for secure communication. As 
a result, network resiliency deteriorates. Considering these results, setting   value to 2 
seems to be an optimal decision for our mechanism.  
 51  
 
 
Figure 4.23 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with basic scheme for 
different   values and random walk mobility model 
 
 
Figure 4.24 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with basic scheme for 
different   values and RPGM model 
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reason for these changes in    value is to minimize the fluctuations in local connectivity 
level of network.  
Table 4.5 Parameters for different   values when DKRU mechanism is used with Du's 
scheme and Random Walk mobility model 
 DKRU with Du's scheme 
  = 1   = 2   = 3   = 4 
  300 300 300 300 
   3 3 3 3 
  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
     10 10 10 10 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   80 80 80 80 
   100 150 80 80 
 
Table 4.6 Parameters for different   values when DKRU mechanism is used with Du's 
scheme and RPGM model 
 DKRU with Du's scheme 
  = 1   = 2   = 3   = 4 
  300 300 300 300 
   3 3 3 3 
  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
     10 10 10 10 
   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   80 80 80 80 
   200 200 200 200 
 
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 show the additionally compromised links ratios for Random 
Walk mobility and RPGM models. According to these schemes, resiliency performance 
of DKRU with Du's scheme does not change significantly when   is equal to 2, 3 and 4. 
The reason is that, neighboring nodes share more common keys in Du's scheme, 
compared to the basic scheme. Hence, the number of keys used in communication links 
may already be more than or equal to 2.  However, when   is 1, the resiliency of 
network is worsened because two nodes can communicate even if they share only one 
key. When this shared key is compromised, their communication link can be easily 
decrypted by an attacker.  
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Figure 4.25 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with Du's scheme for 
different   values and random walk mobility model 
 
 
Figure 4.26 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with Du's scheme for 
different   values and RPGM model 
4.8.  Scalability Analysis 
The number of sensor nodes used in a WSN may vary significantly according to 
the application type. As the number of nodes in a network grows, the connectivity and 
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resiliency performance of the network should not be worsened.  Scalability of a security 
mechanism can be defined as the ability to support various network sizes [18]. To 
analyze the scalability property of our mechanism, we analyze its performance for 
different network sizes. In this analysis, we use Du's scheme as key predistibution basis 
and apply our DKRU mechanism when the deployment area is        ,      
     and           square meters, respectively. In each of these network sizes, we 
measure the global connectivity, local connectivity and resiliency performance of our 
mechanism. Results of our analysis show that the performance of our mechanism is not 
significantly affected by the network size. Thus, our mechanism is fairly scalable. 
Details of our analysis are given in the following subsections.  
4.8.1.  Parameters for different network sizes 
Parameters we use in key predistribution and deployment phases for different 
network sizes are given in Table 4.7. The parameters of DKRU mechanism for different 
mobility models are the same as the parameters given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.7 Parameters for different network sizes 
 
Deployment area (m
2
) 
800 x 800 1000 x 1000 1200 x 1200 
Number of sensor nodes 6,400 10,000 14,400 
Number of grid cells 64 100 144 
Number of nodes in each grid cell 100 100 100 
Area of each grid cell (m
2
) 100 x 100 100 x 100 100 x 100 
Size of global key pool 100,000 100,000 100,000 
Size of group key pools 2724 1789 1264 
Horizontal and vertical key pool 
overlapping factor 
0,2 0,2 0,2 
Diagonal key pool overlapping factor 0.05 0.05 0.05 
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4.8.2.  Global Connectivity Analysis 
Figures 4.27 and 4.28 show that our mechanism provides almost perfect global 
connectivity for different networks sizes. For RPGM model, there are some minor 
decreases in global connectivity for certain time periods; however, these decreases are 
due to the underlying mobility model. Overall, we can say that our DKRU mechanism 
is scalable in terms of global connectivity.  
 
Figure 4.27 Global Connectivity in DKRU with Du's scheme for different network sizes 
and RPGM model 
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Figure 4.28 Global Connectivity in DKRU with Du's scheme for different network sizes 
and random walk mobility model 
4.8.3.  Local Connectivity Analysis 
When we analyze local connectivity of our mechanism for different network sizes 
(Figure 4.29 and 4.30), we can see that local connectivity values converge to the same 
connectivity ratio regardless of the network size. In Figure 4.30, for 800 x 800 m
2
 
deployment area, local connectivity decreases more slowly compared to other network 
sizes. However, its convergence value is very close to the ones of 1000 x 1000 and 1200 
x 1200 m
2
 network sizes. 
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Figure 4.29 Local Connectivity in DKRU with Du's scheme for different network sizes 
and RPGM model 
 
 
Figure 4.30 Local Connectivity in DKRU with Du's scheme for different network sizes 
and random walk mobility model 
4.8.4.  Resiliency Analysis 
Figures 4.31 and 4.32 demonstrate that our mechanism provides almost the same 
level of resiliency for different network sizes. In other words, security of our 
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mechanism is not weakened as the network gets larger. This flexibility against the 
increase in number of sensor nodes implies that our mechanism shows good scalability 
feature. 
 
Figure 4.31 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with Du's scheme for 
different network sizes and RPGM model 
 
 
Figure 4.32 Additionally compromised links ratio in DKRU with Du's scheme for 
different network sizes and random walk mobility model 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we proposed Dynamic Keyring Update (DKRU) mechanism for 
Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs). Our mechanism can be used together 
with different key predistribution schemes and it increases the local and global 
connectivity performance of these schemes. Using DKRU mechanism, a sensor node 
can update its keyring by observing the most frequent keys in its 1-hop and 2-hop 
neighbors' keyrings. Due to the mobile nature of network, neighbors of a node change 
continuously. Yet, DKRU mechanism helps sensor nodes to adapt to the network, 
regardless of their predeployment key distribution model.  
We analyze performance of DKRU mechanism when it is used together with two 
different key predistribution schemes which are the basic scheme [3] and Du's scheme 
[6]. We also use two different mobility models for performance evaluation. Our results 
show that DKRU mechanism provides a significant increase to local and global 
connectivity of these key predistribution schemes in mobile case. We provide almost 
perfect global connectivity, which means that the global connectivity ratio is close to 
one in all cases. Moreover, local connectivity of DKRU-powered mechanisms is 40% 
higher than the local connectivity of original schemes. Another advantage of our 
mechanism is that, it does not increase connectivity at a high cost of resiliency and 
communication overhead.   Additionally compromised links ratio of our mechanism is 
very close to original schemes and for some cases we provide better resiliency. 
Moreover, DKRU mechanism is scalable and brings about only a small amount of 
additional communication overhead.  
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